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1969] CURRENT DECISIONS
prudence, for even while reaffirming the privacy and inviolability of an
individuals home and his right to read or view what he pleases thereto,
the Court did nothing which might denigrate the rights of the public
or inhibit the police power to enforce other statutory provisions re-
garding obscenity '
HALDANE ROBERT MAYER
Labor Law-NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ORDER REQUIRING
PAYMENT OF FRINGE BENEFITS. NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357 (1969).
The respondent was a member of the Roofers Contractors' Association,
a multi-employer association through which a contract with the roofer's
union was in effect from August 1960, to August 1963.1 He fulfilled all
of his obligations under tis contract. A new agreement was then ne-
gotiated for 1963-1967 which the respondent refused to acknowledge.2
seizing the obscene films, matter of which no mention had been made in the warrant.
This was a clear violation of the fourth amendment provision that no "warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Citing
Marron v. United States, 275 U.. 192 (1927), emphasis was given to the fact that
an officer has no discretion when searching under authority of a warrant describing
one item to seize another item. It was further noted that since Stanley was not
under arrest at the time, this was not a case of a search and seizure incident to arrest.
89 S. Ct. at 1251.
16. Anticipating that an argument might be raised that statutes prohibiting possession
are necessary and complementary to those prohibiting sale and distribution, i.e., without
such statutes untold difficulties in proving intent to distribute or of accumulating evi-
dence of distribution would result, the Court recalled that in Smith v. California, 361 US.
147, 155 (1959), a similar argument had been held insufficient to justify abuse of in-
dividual rights. While unconvinced that such difficulties will result from this decision,
the Court said that "even if they did they would [not] justify infringement of the
individual's right to read or observe what he pleases." 89 S. Ct. at 1243.
1. The contract was negotiated by the Roofers Local 36, United Slate, Tile, &
Composition Roofers, Damp & Waterproof Workers Association and the Roofers
Contractors' Association, of which the respondent had been a member since 1949.
Joseph T. Strong, 152 N.L.R.B. 9, 10 (1965).
2. Id. Strong originally contended that since he had withdrawn from the Associa-
tion, he was not bound by the contract which it negotiated. So long as appropriately
timed, such withdrawal from a multi-employer association has been acknowledged by
the Board. See, e.g., Seattle Automotive Wholesalers Ass'n, 140 N.L.R.B. 1393 (1963);
Cooks Local 327, 131 N.L.R.B. 198 (1961). However, an attempt to withdraw is not
appropriately timed, and is therefore invalid, if made after the negotiation of a con-
tract by the association on the employer's behalf. NLRB v. Jeffries Banknote Co.,
281 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1960); Evening News Ass'n, 154 N.L.R.B. 1494 (1965); Cooke &
Jones, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 1664 (1964); Fairbanks Dairy, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 893 (1964).
In Retail Assoc's., Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 395 (1958), the Board held that when
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The NLRB found that he had engaged m unfair labor practices, 3 and
ordered him to refrain from such action and to pay the fringe benefits4
which the new contract provided. Upon petition by the Board to en-
force the order,5 the respondent maintained that the Board had erred
in including in its order the requirement that he pay the fringe benefits.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit modified the order by
eliminating the requirement that the respondent pay the fringe benefits."
The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the original order that
the respondent pay the fringe benefits.7 The finding of the Court was
based upon the statutory authority of the NLRB to effectuate the poli-
cies of the National Labor Relations Act,' and the public responsibility
"actual bargaining negotiations have begun, we would not permit, except on mutual
consent, an abandonment of the unit upon which each side has comrmtted itself,
absent unusual circumstances." Such was the withdrawal attempt by Strong. His with-
drawal letter of January, 1962, had no legal efficacy since the previous contract had
not yet expired, and there was no provision for prior termnation. Further, while
negotiations for the 1963-67 contract were pending, Strong, although put on notice
thereof took no subsequent steps to reinstitute his withdrawal proclamation. In fact,
he proceeded to honor the new contract, and met fringe benefit requirements as
provided by it for the months of August and September, 1963.
3. 152 N.L.R.B. at 13. The respondents refusal to sign the contract negotiated on
his behalf by the Association was a violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1), (5) (1964):
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
Section 157 guarantees employees the right to organize and bargain collectively with
their employers.
4. 152 N.L.R.B. at 14. Fringe benefits have been defined as "deferred, contingent
compensation which the employees of signatories may be entitled to receive in addi-
tion to their wages, and which was procured for them by their bargaining agent
Hobbs v. Lewis, 159 F Supp. 282, 286 (D.D.C. 1958).
5. Orders of the NLRB are not self-enforcing. The Board may petition a Federal
Court of Appeals for enforcement; any party aggrieved by a final order of the Board
may similarly obtain review of that order. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e),(f) (1964).
6. NLRB v. Strong, 386 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1967).
7. NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357 (1969).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964)-
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of
the opinion that any person has engaged in unfair labor prac-
tice, then the Board shall cause to be served on such person an order
requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice,
and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees
with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this sub-
chapter
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of the Board to reimburse employees for losses suffered-due to an unfair
labor practice. 9
In enforcing the Act in unfair labor practice cases, the NLRB does not
merely issue "cease and desist" orders, but also requires "affirmative ac-
non." 10 Its power is not limted to ordering reinstatement of employees
with or without back pay." An order requiring an employer to com-
pensate employees for back wages and welfare fund payments pursuant
to the contract has been termed reasonably calculated to remedy the
employer's violation of the Act.12 Further, an order to reimburse em-
ployees for "any losses they may have suffered" as a resut of their em-
ployer's violation is within the authority of the Board.3 Its power to
issue orders has been characterized by the Supreme Court as- remedial,
not punitive. 4 Such power is to be exercised to supplement its author-
9. The Court cited Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941), as authority
to support its decision. In that case, the Board ordered the employer to. pay a sum
equal to what the employees would have normally earned, less any amount earned
during their unemployment period, and any losses willfully incurred. Id. at 197 See
United Steelworkers v. American Int'l Aluminum Corp., 334 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1964).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
11. Id. The only order specifically mentioned m § 160(c), "reinstatement of em-
ployees with or without back pay," emphasizes the power of the Board not only to
prevent further unfair labor practices, but also to rectify violations already committed.
Since the sole limitation of the section is to "effectuate the policies of [the Act],"
Congress has seen fit not to establish preordained remedies for each offense. Rather,
the Board has been permutted to set the tenor of its own authority, subject to judicial
review upon enforcement, by appropriate and specific treatment based upon the unique
circumstances of each case. See Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533
(1943), in which an employer was ordered to reimburse his employees in full for
amounts which had been deducted from their wages and paid to their umon, which
was dominated in formation and administration by the employer. See note 15 mfra.
Cf. NLRB v. Sunshine Mining Co., 125 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1942); Swift & Co. v. NLRB
106 F.2d 87 (10th Cir. 1939).
12. In NLRB v. George E. Light Boat Storage, Inc, 373 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1967),
the employees were wrongfully discharged because of union activity. The order
required not only payment of back wages but also interest thereon.
13. In Ogle Protection Serv., Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. 545 (1964), the employers were
ordered to perform on the contract retroactively from the date on which it was to
go into effect since the violated contract had an automatic renewal clause. Accord,
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
14. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938). See, e.g., NLRB v.
H & H Plastics Mfg. Co., 389 F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1968), in which the court held that
only when the Board abused its discretion to formulate an appropriate remedy may
the federal courts deny enforcement; NLRB v. United Nuclear Corp., 381 F.2d 972
(10th Cir. 1967), in which the court held that an order of the Board should stand
unless it can be shown that it was an attempt to achieve ends other than those which
can be said to effectuate the policies of the Act. See generally Elam v. NLRB, 395
F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Stark Ceramics, Inc. v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1967);
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ity to suppress violations, and to mutigate consequences of violations.1 5
An order to enforce a collective bargaining agreement, or to ad-
judicate a contractual dispute, is beyond the authority of the Board,1
but its authority to effectuate the policies of the Act may be concurrent
with the authority of the law to remedy a breach of contract. 17 Although
arbitration and court action are the principal sources of contract inter-
pretation in these cases, the Board may still take affirmative action to
Operating Eng'rs Local 138 v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Ford
Motor Co., 119 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1941).
15. The Board is authorized to remedy violations by unions as well as by em-
ployers. 29 U.s.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1964)-
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title
Section 157 guarantees employees the right to organize and bargain collectively with
their employers.
In Carpenters Local 160 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651 (1961), the Board was not permitted
to require a union to refund dues paid to it by members, absent a showing that it
had coerced them to join or remain members, but in NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical
Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939), an order requiring an employer to withdraw recognition
from his employees' organization was held valid where there was evidence that the
employer was responsible for the formation of the organization. Such conduct by an
employer is contrary to the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1964)-
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(2) to
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it
See Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533 (1943).
An employer's denial of seniority rights of its employees, who go on strike after the
employer's wrongful refusal to recognize their union, constitutes a violation of
the Act. An order requiring the employer to accord strikers their seniority rights
was held reasonable and appropriate in NLRB v. Wheeling Pipe Line, Inc, 229 F.2d
391 (8th Cir. 1956). See, e.g., NLRB v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 120 F.2d 262
(3d Cir.), cert. dented, 314 U.S. 693 (1941).
16. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hyde, 339 F.2d 568, 572-73 (9th Cir. 1964); United Steel-
workers v. American Int'l Corp., 334 F2d 147, 152 (5th Cir. 1964)
17. Although 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964), confers jurisdiction to the federal district
courts in suits for violation of collective bargaining contracts, the authority of the
Board is not displaced if the violation is also contrary to the policies of the Act.
Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U.S. 195, 197-98 (1962). See, e.g., NLRB v. C & C
Plywood Corp, 385 U.S. 421 (1967); Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261,
268 (1964); Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 101 n.9 (1961). For
example, discharge of an employee for union membership may be a breach of contract.
However, it is also an unfair labor practice which may be remedied by reinstatement
with or without back pay under § 160(c) of the Act, even though the Board order
prescribes the same remedy reserved by the contract. In NLRB v. Great Dane
Trailers, Inc, 388 U.S. 26, 30-31 n.7 (1967), the court lent support to this rationale:
"[T]he complaint stated an unfair labor practice. The fact that the conduct
complained of might also have supported an action under [29 U.S.C. § 185] did not
deprive the Board of jurisdiction. '
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remedy -an unfair labor practice wich is in violaton.-of the Act."
However, it has at times declined to exercise its jurisdicftin to deal with
unfair labor practices where federal labor policy would best be served
by leaving the parties to other processes of law 9
The holding of the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Strong20 has served
to modify the authority of the Board by enlarging the base from which
"affirmative action" as provided in Section 160 (c) to effectuate the poli-
cies of the Act may be taken.2l Although specific reference is made
therein only to remuneration for prior services, the fact that fringe, bene-
fits do not constitute direct compensation was not considered fatal to
the issue.22 Such benefits are receivable in addition to direct compen-
sation, and an unfair labor practice may cause pecuniary loss to an em-
ployee in both areas. Thus, once an employer's action is determined to
be an unfair labor practice, the Board may now take remedial action by
ordering payment of lost fringe benefits, considered now to constitute
"back pay" 23
NICHOLAS STUART REYNOLDS
Federal Criminal Procedure-HABEAs CORPUS PROCEDURES-DIs-
CRETION To DENY SuCCESsIVE HABEAS CORPUS APPLICATIONS WITH-
OUT A HEARING. Hilbrnch v. Unted States, 406 F.2d 850 (7th Cir.
1969)
In 1963 petitioner was convicted of bank robbery His appeal,
based on the contention that he was not brought before the United
States Commissioner with the requisite dispatch, and that his confession
18. Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U.S. 195, 197-98 (1962). It should be noted
that Congress established the judicial remedy of 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964), in lieu of a
proposal to make breach of a collective bargaining agreement itself an unfair labor
practice. Textile Workers Umon v. Lincoln Mills, 353 US. 448, 452 (1957). See
Mendelsohn, Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements Under Taft-Hartley Section
301, 66 YALE L.J. 167 (1956).
19. In Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955), the Board recognized the
arbitrator's award m an attempt to encourage voluntary settlement of labor disputes.
In Consolidated Aircraft Corp, 47 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943), the Board refused to exercise
jurisdiction where the parties had not exhausted their rights and remedies under the
contract.
20. 393 US. 357 (1969).
21. In a recent case, the court alluded to NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357 (1969), to
affirm the authority of the Board to determine back pay due wronged employees.
NLRB v. K & H Specialties Co, Inc, 407 F.2d 820 (6th Cir. 1969).
22. 393 U.S. at - n.4.
23. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
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